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REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF THE INSTALLMENT
LAND CONTRACT
RICHARD H. LEE*
This is the second of a series of three articles dealing with certain
aspects of the installment land contract. The first article' dealt with the
nature of the contracting parties' interests, primarily with the effect of
equitable conversion. This article proposes to consider the remedies avail-
able, first to the vendor and then to the purchaser, upon breach by the
opposite party.
I. REMEDIES OF THE VENDOR
A. Suit at Law for Damages
Where there has been a substantial breach of a land contract by the
purchaser, and the vendor is not in default, the general rule, in both the
United States and England, is that the vendor may recover for the loss
of his bargain, the difference between the contract price and the market
price.' Of course, allowance must be made for any payments advanced
by the purchaser which are retained by the vendor.
The market price of land, however, is not easily established. It would
seem that the contract price itself is some evidence of the market price,
but the use of such a standard would rule out any recovery at all.' Where
the vendor has resold the property after the purchaser's breach and the
sale was a bona fide one, this may be a satisfactory means of determining
the market price.4 A valid liquidated damage clause may be a solution to
the problem and it will generally be given effect.5 Testimony of experts
as to the value of the land because of its location, area and productiveness
is generally admissible to show market value, and in most states evidence
of prices paid on sales of similar land in the area is considered relevant if
sufficiently close in time to the contract date.6
Recovery for injury to the vendor's reliance interest is generally
allowed and would include items and expenses reasonably incurred by the
vendor in preparation for the purchaser's performance, such as counsel
* Professor of Law, University of Miami.
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fees in correcting the title and the cost of abstracts or surveys.7 Injury
occasioned by the construction of improvements upon the land which were
contemplated by the parties are compensible. s Of course, there cannot be
a recovery for loss of the benefit of the bargain and for the injury to the
reliance interest as well, as the expenses incurred in reliance upon the
purchaser's performance will have been taken into account in determining
the loss of profit.
When the vendor has fully performed his part of the contract and
has delivered a conveyance of the legal title to the purchaser he should be
and is entitled to bring suit at law for the full purchase price.9 Even if
the contract was not signed by the purchaser and thus does not satisfy
the Statute of Frauds, once there has been a conveyance the vendor should
be able to recover.' ° But where the contract is still executory there is a
split of authority as to whether a vendor may recover at law for the pur-
chase price." The problem is basically one of lack of mutuality arising
from supposed limitations upon the power of courts of law to condition a
judgment for the purchase price upon the vendor's delivery of a deed
conveying a marketable title. The deposit of a deed in court should be
adequate, if in fact title is marketable. In a jurisdiction where law and
equity are administered by one court as one form of action there should
be no difficulty in solving the mutuality question and thus judgment for
the full purchase price should be allowed.1" The weight of authority, how-
ever, is to the contrary and considers those cases allowing suit for pur-
chase price at law irregular expedients to give to the law courts the power
of equity to award specific performance.'
3
Where the purchaser has delivered a note or series of notes to secure
the payment of the purchase price, the vendor, upon the purchaser's de-
fault, may sue on either the contract 4 or the notes.'5 In as much as in-
stallment payments under an installment land contract are usually inde-
pendent promises until the last payment is due, the vendor need not tender
a deed and marketable title prior to the contract closing date, and lack
of mutuality would be no defense to a suit at law.'" Of course, if the
7. Biddle v. Biddle, 202 Mich. 160, 168 N.W. 92 (1918). See McCoRmicx, op. cit supra
note 6, at 712-13.
8. See Minsky's Follies of Fla., Inc. v. Sennes, 206 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1953); L. Albert
& Son v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 178 F.2d 182 (2d Cir. 1949); Fuller & Perdue, The
Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 373 (1936-37).
9. Washington v. Soria, 73 Miss. 865, 19 So. 485 (1896).
10. Holmstrom v. Barstad, 147 Minn. 172, 179 N.W. 737 (1920); 49 Am. JUR. Statute
of Frauds § 552 (1943). Cottra, Williams v. Faile, 118 So.2d 599 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1960).
11. See 3 AMtRicAN LAW OF PROPERTY, § 11.77 (Casner ed. 1952).
12. Bonner v. Finney, 110 Cal. App. 518, 294 Pac. 466 (1930); Fairlawn Heights Co.
v. Theis, 133 Ohio St. 387, 14 N.E.2d 1 (1938).
13. Prichard v. Mulhall, 127 Iowa 545, 103 N.W. 774 (1905).
14. Coaling Coal & Coke Co. v. Howard, 130 Ga. 807, 61 S.E. 987 (1908).
15. Walker v. Hewitt, 109 Ore. 366, 220 Pac. 147 (1923).
16. Ibid.
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vendor rescinds or cancels the contract or asserts a forfeiture, he cannot
recover on the notes or in contract for the purchase price.' Where there is
an acceleration clause and the vendor elects to accelerate, or where the
installment payment overdue is the last one, then the vendor must tender
a marketable title as this would be a condition precedent to the purchaser's
liability.' 8
B. Retention of Payments as Liquidated Damage
The distinction in general contract law between liquidated damage
and a penalty is that the former bears a reasonable relationship to actual
damage occasioned by the breach, is designed to render certain that which
is uncertain and difficult of proof, and is essentially compensatory;
whereas, the latter is a form of punishment for breach, bears no relation
to actual damage and may easily result in unjust enrichment of the party
enforcing the provision.' 9 There is no general rule for determining whether
a stipulation in a contract is enforceable as a bona fide liquidated damage
clause, or is a penalty and therefore unenforceable. It depends upon the
facts, the intention of the parties, and the construction of the contract.
Although it involves an inquiry into the facts, it is usually considered a
matter of law to be determined by the court.2" A named sum will be
regarded as a penalty where the defaulting party must pay the same
amount regardless of the nature of the breach. 2' Certainly where the
contract equates liquidated damage with installments paid and thus in-
creases the forfeiture in inverse proportion to the actual damage suffered,
such a provision is a penalty and not a legitimate liquidated damage
clause.2 2 However, the general rule in the United States is to enforce such
forfeiture clauses in installment land contracts despite the harsh result.
23
This would seem to put the land contract in a special category, and indeed
it does, but the problem is really not one of distinguishing between liqui-
dated damage on the one hand and penalty on the other. Even in the
absence of any such clause, regardless of what it is called, by ,the weight of
authority the purchaser in default cannot recover payments made from a
vendor not in default.
2 4
17. Orzechowski v. Kolodziejski, 281 Mich. 657, 275 N.W. 722 (1937).
18. See Prichard v. Mulhall, supra note 13; but see Walker v. Hewitt, supra note 15.
19. Pembroke v. Caudill, 160 Fla. 948, 37 So.2d 538 (1948).
20. Chace v. Johnson, 98 Fla. 118, 123 So. 519 (1929), holding that a clause allowing
forfeiture of payments in an installment land contract was a penalty for the benefit of the
vendor and that he could waive it and seek actual damages.
21. Pembroke v. Caudill, supra note 19; Poinsettia Dairy Prods., Inc. v. Wessel Co., 123
Fla. 120, 166 So. 306 (1936).
22. See Chace v. Johnson, supra note 20; but see Beck v. Megli, 153 Kan. 721, 114 P.2d
305 (1941), where a provision for forfeiture of $500 and all sums paid under the contract
was held to be liquidated damage and not a penalty. The purchaser, however, had made no
payments; only $500 was involved.
23. Seekins v. King, 66 R.I. 105, 17 A.2d 869 (1941); Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 8, 11 (1953).
24. Sawyer v. Sterling Realty Co., 41 Cal. App. 2d 715, 107 P.2d 449 (1940) (After
the vendor had quieted title against defaulting purchaser in previous action, the purchaser
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The typical Deposit Receipt Agreement, in contrast to the Install-
ment Land Contract, usually provides for a down payment of ten percent
or less, and that in the event of the purchaser's breach, such down pay-
ment is to be retained by the vendor. Whether designated "liquidated
damage" or not, such a provision is fair, within the contemplation of the
parties, and should be enforced. Such a payment is in the nature of
"earnest money" and is justified because it is made in consideration of
the vendor having removed the property from the market and having
entered into the contract. The English courts distinguish between earnest
money and purchase money and permit forfeiture of the former25 but
not of the latter.26 If a rule of thumb is required this is a fairly good one,
although its application is more than merely mechanical, as it does involve
an interpretation of the contract and an inquiry into the facts.2 T It is
merely another way of determining what is a reasonable, and thus enforce-
able, liquidated damage. Any reasonable liquidated damage clause should
be given effect, and if, in an installment land contract, there were a
formula provision for liquidated damages based upon loss of bargain,
operating only on a serious breach and taking into account the value of
the purchaser's use and occupancy, improvements made, etc., no one
should seriously object to its enforcement, nor should a deposit of ten
percent or less be considered unreasonable in most instances.28 But to
equate liquidated damages with the forfeiture of installments paid is
unjust and wholly out of line with present distinctions between a liqui-
dated damage clause and a penalty.
In Pembroke v. Caudill,29 a Florida case, the contract provided for a
deposit of $6,200 on a purchase price of $67,500, to be deemed liquidated
damage in the event of breach by the purchaser. The purchaser signed the
contract and gave. a check for the deposit. The next day he stopped pay-
ment on the check. The vendor brought suit on the contract under the
liquidated damage provision. The Supreme Court held the stipulation to
be a penalty, on the ground that it bore no relation to any actual damage,
and denied recovery. The court refused to speculate on what the result
would have been had the payment actually been made.
sought restitution of installments paid, arguing that California statute made liquidated
damage clause void. Held: the statute did not apply as vendor was entitled to retain
purchase money paid whether designated liquidated damage or not). California, since
Freedman v. Rector, Wardens & Vestrymen of St. Mathias Parish, 37 Cal. 2d 16, 230 P.2d 629
(1951), has become one of the few states firmly opposed to forfeiture. How it did so without
expressly overruling its previous position and without enactment of new legislation will be
discussed in the third article of this series.
25. Hall v. Burnell, [1911] 2 Ch. 551.
26. Cornwall v. Henson, [1900] 2 Ch. 298.
27. See Howe v. Smith, 27 Ch. D. 89 (1884).
28. But see Federal Land Bank v. Bridgeforth, 233 Ala. 679, 173 So. 66 (1937), where
a $500 deposit on a purchase price of $8,000 was held a penalty. See also Freedman v.
Rector, Wardens & Vestrymen of St. Mathias Parish, supra note 24.
29. 160 Fla. 948, 37 So.2d 538 (1948).
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The unanswered question was soon answered, however, in Beatty v.
Flannery,0 when the Florida court refused a defaulting purchaser re-
covery of a $3,000 deposit made on a contract price of $30,000. The
Pembroke case was distinguished solely on the ground that in that case
the vendor was plaintiff. The language of Beatty indicates that Florida
follows the weight of authority in denying recovery of payments made by
a purchaser in default even in the absence of a forfeiture provision."'
But in 1952, in Paradis v. Second Ave. Used Car Co., 2 the same
court relied upon Pembroke, ignored Beatty, and allowed a purchaser to
recover a $4,000 deposit on an unstated purchase price on the ground that
the burden was on the vendor to prove damage and that otherwise the
clause constituted a penalty.
In 1953, the same court, in Haas v. Crisp Realty Co.,33 reversed the
lower court which had allowed forfeiture of a $6,050 deposit on a purchase
price of $15,050. The Supreme Court affirmed its adherence to Beatty
and to "the established rule in practically all American jurisdictions" 4
but sent the case back to have it determined whether, when the reasons for
the purchaser's breach were known, the forfeiture of a deposit, the size of
this one, without a showing of actual damage, might not shock the con-
science of the court.
Later cases indicate that the Florida courts have not yet made up
their minds. 5 They are with the majority and against allowing any re-
covery to a defaulting purchaser, but if the forfeiture is so great that it
shocks the court, they may make an exception to the rule, particularly if
the purchaser was not willful in his breach. They will not aid a vendor in
obtaining a penalty under the guise of liquidated damage, but they will not
prevent him from keeping it if he can get it by himself. And sometimes
they become So interested in the penalty aspect of the vendor's retention
that they do not consider whether the purchaser was in default or not.30
This confusion represents the effort of the Florida courts to work
equity and still be nominally consistent with a rule. The result is apt to
be neither consistent nor equitable. In the first place, the rule denying a
defaulting purchaser restitution of payments made should not be applied
indiscriminately to both earnest money and installment payments. But
once the principle is adopted that a party may not recover damages based
30. 49 So.2d 81 (Fla. 1950).
31. Id. at 82.
32. 61 So.2d 919 (Fla. 1952).
33. 65 So.2d 765 (Fla. 1953).
34. Id. at 768.
35. Lewis v. Belknap, 96 So.2d 212 (Fla. 1957) ($1,500 deposit on $10,000 price for-
feited):; Goldfarb v. Robertson, 82 So.2d 504 (Fla. 1955) ($2,500 deposit forfeited) ; Lind-
gren v. Van Fleet, 112 So.2d 881 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1959) ($222.75 deposit on $1,200 price
ordered returned to purchaser).
36. See Paradis v. Second Ave. Used Car Co., supra note 32.
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on his own default, the rest follows logically. The difficulty lies with the
principle. It may be proper to refuse damages to a party who has caused
his own injury, but our present sophistication in the field of restitution
should allow us to recognize that suits for restitution of payments made
are based upon unjust enrichment of the vendor, not upon injury to the
purchaser.
8 7
C. Retention of Deposit as an Alternative Performance
Similar in form to the liquidated damage clause is a provision per-
mitting one or either of the parties to the contract to pay a sum of money
in lieu of any other performance. If it is determined that the parties
intended the payment of a sum of money or a forfeiture of the deposit
by the purchaser to be an alternative to any other performance under
the contract, then, of course, the payment of the money or the forfeiture
is not liquidated damage, but is performance itself and there has been
no breach. Payment of money under such a provision is an option to any
other performance contemplated by the contract and where such an option
is exercised, of course, no action for specific performance should lie. 8
Where the provision is held not to involve an alternative performance,
but to be a true liquidated damage clause, it is generally held not to
render the remedy at law adequate so as to defeat an action for specific
performance."'
D. Suit for Specific Performance
Upon the purchaser's default the vendor may bring suit for specific
performance of the contract. The vendor's right to bring such a suit in
equity depends, not upon any supposed doctrine of affirmative mutuality
of remedy,4 but upon the inadequacy of his remedy at law.4 Those juris-
dictions which allow a vendor to bring suit at law for the full purchase
price upon tender of a marketable title and deposit of a deed in court, are,
in effect, permitting the bringing of an equity action at law.42 Regardless
of the court in which the action is brought, it is equitable in nature and
subject to all the requirements of equity.43 One of the difficulties of specific
performance, as applied to the installment land contract, is that unless
there is an acceleration clause in the contract the vendor has no right to
demand full payment by the purchaser because the contract calls only for
installments and the only performance he can compel is the one for which
37. See Schwartz v. Syver, 264 Wis. 526, 59 N.W.2d 489 (1953).
38. Davis v. Isenstein, 257 Ill. 260, 100 N.E. 940 (1913). See MCCORMICx, DwMrAEs
§ 154 (1935).
39. See Davis v. Isenstein, supra note 38; CooX, CASES ON EQurrY 418 n.8 (4th ed.
1948).
40. WALSH, Eourry § 68 (1930).
41. Hodges v. Kowing, 58 Conn. 12, 18 Atl. 979 (1889).
42. Fairlawn Heights Co. v. Theis, 133 Ohio St. 389, 14 N.E.2d 1 (1938).
143. 3 ArcAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.77 (Casner ed. 1952).
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he contracted. But, assuming that the vendor can call for the full purchase
price, his bill for specific performance must still contend with all of the
various defenses available either in equity or law. Fraud or misrepresenta-
tion," duress," mistake," sharp practice,47 hardship,48 failure to make a
complete disclosure, 4 and many other defenses stand between the vendor
and his decree of specific performance. And, when he finally obtains the
decree he seeks, his chances of recovery are still slim. Constitutional"
or statutory5' provisions outlawing imprisonment for debt prevent resort
to imprisonment for contempt and thus eliminate one of the principal
methods whereby equity enforces its decrees. The usual decree of specific
performance will provide that, in the event the purchaser fails to perform,
the property be sold and proceeds used to pay the debt.52 If the property
does not produce enough to satisfy the claim, the vendor may have a
deficiency judgment, and in the unlikely event that the property produces
more than the contract price, the excess will be paid to the purchaser. 58
This is virtually the same result as foreclosure by sale of the vendor's lien,
and the purchaser has most of the protection of a mortgagor. In all likeli-
hood specific performance will result in the vendor losing his land and
becoming an unsecured creditor of the purchaser for at least a portion of
the purchase price.
What then are the advantages to the vendor of suit for specific per-
formance? If the vendor really wishes to be relieved of his obligations in
regard to the land and to salvage what he can from the broken contract,
the action in equity for specific performance is superior to suit at law for
damages or even for the entire purchase price, as it gives the vendor a
security for at least part of the price. Also, it has been suggested that
specific performance, as contrasted with foreclosure of the vendor's lien,
may not result in granting a period of redemption to the vendee. 54 If this
be so, this might be an adequate reason for selecting this particular remedy,
although it is difficult to see why the vendor would not prefer "redemption"
for the full purchase price rather than sale for a portion of the purchase
price coupled with a deficiency judgment. Specific performance would be
desirable where its purpose was to establish the marketability of title to the
satisfaction of a doubting, but otherwise willing, purchaser.5" And where
44. Allen v. Kirk, 219 Pa. 574, 69 AUt. 50 (1908).
45. Collins v. Erdmann, 122 Conn. 626, 191 At]. 521 (1937).
46. Johnson v. Gianacakos, 356 Ill. 410, 190 N.E. 691 (1934).
47. Banaghan v. Malaney, 200 Mass. 46, 85 N.E. 839 (1908).
48. Koch v. Streuter, 232 Ill. 594, 83 N.E. 1072 (1908).
49. Shoop v. Burnside, 78 Kan. 871, 98 Pac. 202 (1908).
50. E.g., FLA. CONST. D=c. oF RIGHTS § 16.
51. E.g., N.Y. Civir RIGHTS LAw § 21.
52. Strauss v. Bendheim, 162 N.Y. 469, 56 N.E. 1007 (1900).
'53. Ibid.
54. Howe, Forfeitures in Land Contracts, CURENT TREsDS n STA LEGisLATioN,
1953-1954, 433 (1955).
55. But see Lynbrook Gardens, Inc. v. Ullmann, 291 N.Y. 472, 53 N.E.2d 353 (1943).
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there is no question as to the solvency of the defaulting purchaser, specific
performance would appear to be a wholly satisfactory remedy. The vendor
is freed of the cost of maintaining the land and of his responsibilities in
regard to it; he need not assume the burden of proving a loss, as would
be the case in an action for damages, and he obtains, as nearly as possible,
the full performance promised him by the purchaser. But, when weighed
against the other alternatives available to a vendor under an installment
land contract, specific performance by the vendor will usually be found
wanting. It demands equity of the vendor-plaintiff and accords the default-
ing purchaser consideration that need not be shown him if the vendor
merely forfeits his rights or forecloses them strictly.
E. The Vendor's Lien
During the period while an installment land contract is executory the
vendor is frequently said to have a lien upon the property which is the
subject of the contract. 6 This is similar to, but not to be confused with,
the vendor's equitable lien which remains in the vendor after he has parted
with the legal title. Here he still has the legal title. True, equitable con-
version treats his interest as security for the purchase price, but it would
be somewhat of a strain even for equitable conversion to reduce his un-
doubted legal ownership to the status of a mere lien. Once he has trans-
ferred legal title he may need the aid of equity in obtaining some sort of
security for the purchase price, but so long as title is still in his name, he
is possessed of much more than an equity. The true vendor's lien is a
creature of equity, revealed as a purely personal right and lost once the
purchaser has transferred the legal title to a bona fide purchaser for
value.57 But a vendor under a contract for sale has legal title superior to
all subsequent equities; it is a misnomer to call it a lien because it is
actually a legal title retained as security.58 Nonetheless, the vendor may
treat his interest as a lien and proceed to enforce it as such.
The purpose of the vendor who resorts to his security interest in the
land is at least two-fold. He seeks to subject the land to his claim for the
purchase price, and to do this, he must foreclose any equity of redemption,
or other right arising from the contract which may exist in the purchaser.
Several methods are available to accomplish these results. He may bring
suit for specific performance, which, as we have already discussed, may
result in a judicial sale of the property and an application of the proceeds
of sale to the payment of the purchaser's debt. He may elect to treat his
security interest in the property as a mortgage and proceed in equity to
foreclose the purchaser's equity of redemption and to have the property
56. Alabama-Florida Co. v. Mays, II Fla, 100, 149 So. 61 (1933).
57. Beebe Stave Co. v. Austin, 92 Ark. 248, 122 S.W. 482 (1909).
58. 4 Po-RaoY, EQUzn" § 1260 (5th ed. Symons 1941).
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sold at a judicial sale in the same manner as if it were a mortgage. 59 In
some jurisdictions the vendor may obtain a decree which, after giving the
defaulting purchaser an extension of time to make good his default,
proceeds to foreclose the purchaser's rights in the land under contract
should he fail to cure his default.6" This is strict foreclosure by judicial
order. In a few states statutes permit the vendor to forfeit the defaulting
purchaser's interest provided statutory notice is given allowing a limited
period of time within which the purchaser may cure his default.6 ' This is
strict foreclosure by self help with an assist from the statute. Finally, if
the vendor need not worry about the contract being a cloud upon his title,
as where it is not recorded, he may treat the contract as cancelled upon
the purchaser's breach and either retain the land for his own use, or sell
to a bona fide purchaser for value, effectively wiping out whatever interest
the purchaser may have.
62
F. Foreclosure by Judicial Sale
Of the various remedies available to the vendor, foreclosure by
judicial sale is the most equitable in that by equating the contract to a
mortgage it gives the purchaser the benefit of all of the safeguards that
equity has created over the years for the benefit of mortgagors. But it is
expensive and time consuming. For instance, it has been estimated that
foreclosure by sale in Wisconsin costs almost twice as much and takes
nearly three times as long as does strict foreclosure by court order.,
The merit of foreclosure by sale is that it does not work a forfeiture of
the purchaser's interest, that it is open and fair, and that it will result in
clearing the vendor's title of any claim by the purchaser. But where other
remedies are available, a vendor will usually select some less cumbersome
method of realizing on his security. If he had been willing from the begin-
ning to foreclose his lien as a mortgage, he might just as well have trans-
ferred the legal title and taken back a purchase money mortgage as his
security.
In many cases the choice of remedy will be dictated by the law of
the jurisdiction. In Florida, for instance, all mortgages must be foreclosed
in chancery 4 unless otherwise provided by statute. So far as real estate
mortgages are concerned, neither sale pursuant to a power contained
in the instrument6 nor strict foreclosure 66 are available. The Florida
statute defining mortgages is, in its terms, broad enough to include
59. Barnard v. Huff, 252 Mich. 258, 233 N.W. 213 (1930). See IOWA CODE § 654.1 (1954).
60. Los Angeles Auto Tractor Co. v. Superior Ct., 94 Cal. App. 433, 271 Pac. 363 (1928).
61. E.g., IowA CODE ch. 656 (1954).
62. McCahill v. Travis Co., 45 So.2d 191 (Fla. 1950).
63. Land Contracts in a Real Estate Sales Program, 7 FED, HOME LoAN BAux REv. 112,
114 (1941) cited in Beuscher, Buying Farms on Installment Land Contracts-A Preface,
1960 Wis. L. REv. 379, 381 (1960).
64. FLA. STAT. § 702.01 (1963).
65. Wylly-Gabbett Co. v. Williams, 53 Fla. 872, 42 So. 910 (1907); BOYER, FLORIDA
REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 32.20 (1961).
66. Georgia Cas. Co. v. O'Donnell, 109 Fla. 290, 147 So. 267 (1933).
[VOL. XIX
INSTALLMENT LAND CONTRACT
installment land contracts, 67 but, except where the contract was used as
part of a transaction securing a loan, as distinguished from purchase
money, it has not been held to apply to installment land contracts.68
In Florida, the judicially prescribed method of realizing on the vendor's
retained title security is "strict foreclosure" or suit in equity in the nature
of strict foreclosure.69 But this is not strict foreclosure in the traditional
sense, where the vendor or mortgagee retains his legal title and the equi-
table interest of the purchaser or mortgagor is foreclosed unless he makes
payment within the time allowed. Florida's strict foreclosure results in a
judicial sale of the property in the event that the purchaser fails to cure
his default within the extension of time given him by the court. In
Florida the mortgagor's right to redeem ends upon confirmation of the
sale foreclosing his rights. 70 The so called strict foreclosure of the
purchaser's contract rights is, in Florida, subject to the same principles
as is foreclosure of a mortgage, and the right to cure the default also
ends with the sale. 7' Thus, there is very little difference in Florida between
using the statutory procedure applicable to foreclosure of mortgage liens
72
and resorting to "strict foreclosure" under equitable principles. As a
result, a careful attorney will comply with the statute. The implication
of Mid-State Investment Corp. v. O'Steen,7 is that if the contract
had been evidence of a bona fide sale, and not security for a debt other
than purchase money, the vendor would have been entitled to re-enter
pursuant to the terms of the contract and would not have been a tres-
passer; thus there might be no need to foreclose. 74 But the contract would
still be a cloud upon the seller's title and foreclosure would seem at
least as efficacious as a suit to quiet title to relieve the vendor of this
uncertainty.
G. Strict Foreclosure of the Purchaser's Contract Rights
In some states a vendor may elect either foreclosure by sale or strict
foreclosure. In Wisconsin, for instance, foreclosure of a mortgage or
installment land contract under the statutory provisions for mortgage
foreclosure75 allows the mortgagor or purchaser at least a year after the
date of judgment before the land may be sold or even advertised for sale.76
But, if the vendor so desires, he may seek strict foreclosure. And in
Wisconsin, strict foreclosure does not result in a judicial sale as it does
67. FLA. STAT. § 697.01 (1963).
68. See Mid-State Investment Corp. v. O'Steen, 133 So.2d 455 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1961).
69. Barnett v. Dollison, 125 Fla. 254, 169 So. 665 (1936).; Wordinger v. Wirt, 112
Fla. 822, 151 So. 47 (1933).
70. Ross v. Carey, 174 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1949).
71. Wordinger v. Wirt, supra note 69.
72. FLA. STAT. ch. 702 (1963).
73. Supra note 68.
74. See Lee, Interests Created by the Installment Land Contract, 19 U. MIMsI L.
REV. (1965).
75. WIs. STAT. § 278.01 (1957).
76. Wis. STAT. § 278.10 (1957).
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in Florida, but it merely forecloses the purchaser's equity of redemption
and entitles the vendor to a writ of assistance to aid him in recovering
possession of the property." If strict foreclosure is obtained there is
no statutory period of redemption, but the period is within the discre-
tion of the court.71 Judges generally fix redemption periods far shorter
than the statutory year which the mortgage foreclosure statute requires.79
In as much as strict foreclosure is equally as effective as the statutory
mortgage foreclosure procedure in clearing the vendor's title, and may
permit him to retain the land and the payments as well,"0 the vendor's
choice would seem clear.
Although from the purchaser's point of view strict foreclosure by
judicial order may seem a harsher remedy than foreclosure by sale, it
must be remembered that it is, after all, an equitable remedy. A recent
Idaho case illustrates the equitable nature of strict foreclosure. In Walker
v. Nunnenkamp,1 the purchasers brought suit in equity to rescind an
installment land contract for the fraud of the vendor. The vendor counter-
claimed for strict foreclosure. On appeal by the purchasers, the court
affirmed the finding of no fraud, but remanded the case to determine if the
portion of the purchase price paid was disproportionate to the actual
damage sustained by the vendors. In denying a petition for recall of
the remittitur the court emphasized the equitable nature of the action,
and pointed out that equity could require as a condition of awarding fore-
closure that the vendors make affirmative proof of their damage to fore-
stall injustice to the purchasers, and that if a judicial sale seemed the
fairest way of protecting the interests of both parties the court had power
to order one. s2
Unfortunately, the attitude of the courts is not uniform in adjuncting
the relief to the equities of the particular situation. In Industrial Loan &
Investment Co. v. Lowe,s8 a recent Nebraska case, the court held that
where the contract provided that time should be of the essence and that
upon the purchaser's default the vendors should be entitled to immediate
possession and forfeiture of all payments made, no inquiry need be made
into the relationship between payments made and the vendors' actual
damage because the suit was one to quiet title rather than one for strict
foreclosure.8" It would seem that in either event the vendor was seeking
equity and that he should be required to do equity. 5
77. Diggle v. Baulden, 48 Wis. 477, 4 N.W. 678 (1880); WIs. STAT. § 281.28 (1957).
78. Binzel v. Oconomowoc Brewing Co., 226 Wis. 498, 277 N.W. 98 (1938).
79. Beuscher, Buying Farms on Installment Land Contracts-A Preface, 1960 Wis. L.
REv. 379, 381 (1960).
80. Diggle v. Baulden, supra note 77.
81. 84 Idaho 485, 373 P.2d 559 (1962).
82. Id. at 497, 373 P.2d at 567.
83. 173 Neb. 624, 114 N.W.2d 393 (1962).
84. Id. at 631, 114 N.W.2d at 398.
85. See Vanneman, Strict Foreclosure of Land Contracts, 14 MniN. L. Riv. 342 (1930).
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H. Forfeiture of Purchaser's Payments
Where, as is usually the case, the contract provides that time is of
the essence and that upon default by the purchaser the vendor may termi-
nate the contract and retain the payments made as liquidated damage,
the forfeiture may be effected by the vendor's own act without resort to
any court. However, the effectiveness of such unilateral action is de-
batable. It may be adequate enough when the purchaser is not in posses-
sion and the contract is not recorded, but usually resort to some court
will have to be made either to recover possession or to clear the vendor's
title. However, when the vendor's acts are considered by a court in some
subsequent action they are frequently upheld. For instance, in Thiel v.
Miller,6 the contract made time of the essence, and provided that upon
the purchaser's default the vendor's obligations under the contract should
cease, the rights and payments of the purchaser should be forfeited, and
the vendor should be entitled to immediate possession. After paying at
least $7,500 on a contract price of $30,712.50, the purchaser defaulted.
The vendor notified the purchaser of his election to forfeit the purchaser's
rights under the contract, and at the time of this suit he had already
secured a writ of assistance enabling him to recover the property. In the
present suit in equity the vendor apparantly sought to clear his title of
any claim by the purchaser. The purchaser counterclaimed for rescission
based upon mistake. In holding for the vendor on both issues the court
said,
Appellants not having any right of rescission of the contract, and
it being in full force and effect as to all of its terms, we see no
escape from affirming the judgment of the trial court awarding to
respondents forfeiture of appellants' rights in the ranch, and also
forfeiture, as liquidated damages, of all that portion of the pur-
chase price they have paid to appellants, since it seems to us that
the trial court was fully justified by the evidence in concluding
that appellants had failed to comply with the terms of the con-
tract as written, in substantial respects, and had been given by
respondents fair opportunity to fully comply therewith before
they elected to exercise their right of forfeiture and notified
appellants accordingly. Indeed, counsel for appellants does not
seem to seriously contend but that the conditions of the contract
as written have not been timely complied with by them.I
T
In Kefgen v. Coates,s8 the Supreme Court of Michigan recently up-
held the right of a vendor to declare a forfeiture under the terms of the
contract, and, because the contract dealt with the sale of both land and
personalty, the court emphasized the appropriateness of equitable action
86. 122 Wash. 52, 209 Pac. 1081 (1922).
87. Id. at 59, 209 Pac. 1081, 1084.
88. 365 Mich. 56, 111 N.W.2d 813 (1961).
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to enforce the forfeiture as ejectment would be an inadequate remedy to
recover the personal property.
Some confusion has been introduced into the decisions by the simi-
larity, in ultimate result, of forfeiture at the election of the vendor and
inability of a purchaser in default to obtain restitution. As a practical
matter, if the purchaser in default cannot obtain a refund of his payments,
and such is the weight of authority,89 whether the vendor can declare a
forfeiture is moot. But, nonetheless, decisions have turned upon the
distinction. If the court regards only the forfeiture provision and finds it
invalid as a penalty, as was the case in Pembroke v. Caudill,9 ° it may
deny the vendor recovery, and yet, the same court may deny the purchaser
restitution under the general rule, as did the Florida court in Beatty v.
Flannery.9'
A few jurisdictions provide for forfeiture of a defaulting purchaser's
installment land contract rights by specific statute. 2 These statutes do
little more than give a statutory period of grace to the defaulting purchaser
and make the resulting strict foreclosure all the more binding because it
has statutory authorization. In Iowa, for instance, the statute provides
for forfeiture upon the giving of thirty days notice. It has been held
that for the vendor to take advantage of the statute the contract must have
provided for forfeiture. 4 But in Lake v. Bernstein,95 the Iowa court held
that despite lack of a forfeiture clause the defaulting purchaser could not
recover payments made. The purchaser had paid $1,200 down on a total
price of $3,500 when he defaulted. The vendor subsequently sold the
property to a bona fide purchaser. But the court followed the majority
rule in denying restitution, asserting that the purchaser had abandoned
the contract voluntarily when he lacked funds to complete his payments.
Dissatisfaction of the courts with the harshness of forfeiture re-
quires that the vendor be astute to avoid acquiescence in the purchaser's
default or he may be held to have rescinded the contract and thus be
obligated to restore the purchaser to his position before the contract was
entered. Consequently, a resale by the vendor who has not declared a
forfeiture may be considered a rescission obligating return of the pur-
chaser's payments. 6 Prolonged inactivity on the purchaser's part may be
considered abandonment of the contract entitling the vendor to sell again
without making restitution and without declaring a forfeiture;97 but, to
be safe, the vendor should declare his position unequivocally. Likewise,
89. Haas v. Crisp Realty Co., 65 So.2d 765 (Fla. 1953).
90. 160 Fla. 948, 37 So.2d 538 (1948).
91. 49 So.2d 81 (Fla. 1950).
92. See 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.76 n.8 (Casner ed. 1952).
93. IOWA CODE §§ 656.1, 652.2 (1957).
94. Schwab v. Roberts, 220 Iowa 958, 263 N.W. 19 (1935).
95. 215 Iowa 777, 246 N.W. 790 (1933).
96. Parchen v. Rowley, 196 Wash. 340, 82 P.2d 857 (1938).
97. Lutz v. Cunningham, 240 Iowa 1037, 38 N.W.2d 638 (1949).
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indulgence by the vendor of the purchaser's breaches of contract may be
interpreted as a waiver of the vendor's rights."
1. Obtaining Possession and Quieting Title
Even though the vendor may have a right to declare a forfeiture,
if the purchaser is in possession and refuses to quit, resort to some legal
action is usually necessary to enable the vendor to recover possession.
Sometimes the question of which action lies may so occupy the attention
of the court that it fails to give due consideration to the real equities of
the case. For instance, in Florida, where the courts have been particu-
larly solicitous of the purchaser's rights and where even strict foreclosure
results in a judicial sale,99 the First District Court of Appeal in the recent
case of Huguley v. Hall,' "adjudged the contract in suit 'to be null and
cancelled and to be foreclosed,' barred the defendant and all parties claim-
ing under him 'from any right, title or interest in said premises,' allowed
the defendant ten days in which to deliver up the possession of the
premises to the plaintiff, and ordered the clerk to issue a writ of assistance
if necessary to enforce the decree."'' The case involved a typical install-
ment land contract and the relief was predicated solely upon the pur-
chaser's default in making his payments. One would expect that some sort
of foreclosure action would have been called for, but this is merely a
judicial affirmation of the vendor's right to forfeit. A dictum in the Su-
preme Court opinion which denied certiorari' 012 suggests that the peti-
tioner, having failed to assert affirmatively his equity of redemption, is
deemed to have abandoned it. Nonetheless, if equity requires that an
equity of redemption be foreclosed the court has power to order it regard-
less of the petitioner's assertion. The vendor is the one seeking equity and
he should be compelled to do equity as well. The District Court decision
was per curiam and the facts and reasons for the decision must be gleaned
from Judge Sturgis's well reasoned dissent. But even the dissent is
concerned primarily with the distinctions between ejectment and quiet
title. Inasmuch as the purchaser was in possession and the contract was
not recorded it would seem that perhaps the legal remedy was adequate
and that the suit should have been brought in ejectment.10 3 But, the
decision presupposes that the vendor has a right to forfeit without resort
to any judicial process and seems inconsistent with the philosophy behind
Pembroke v. Caudill'0 4 and Paradis v. Second Ave. Used Car Co.,105 and
with those cases which allow strict foreclosure only when coupled with
98. McBride v. Griffith, 134 Ind. App. 12, 185 N.E.2d 22 (1962).
99. Wordinger v. Wirt, 112 Fa. 822, 151 So. 47 (1933).
100. 141 So.2d 595 (FIa. 1st Dist. 1962), cert. denied, 157 So.2d 417 (Fla. 1963). See
Lee, Interests Created by the Installment Land Contract, 19 U. MIMI L. REv. 367 (1965).
101. 141 So.2d 595, 597-98.
102. 157 So.2d 417, 418 (FIa. 1963),.
103. Sawyer v. Gustason, 96 Fa. 6, 118 So. 57 (1928).
104. Supra note 19.
105. Supra note 32.
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judicial sale.' The result in Huguley seems doubly strange in view of
Florida's position with regard to cancellation of contracts generally. Some-
thing more than mere breach of contract is required-fraud, mistake,
undue influence, or some other independent ground of equity, before a
cancellation will be decreed.0 7 Nonetheless, Huguley is probably a
correct reflection of the Florida law. Safeguards are thrown around fore-
closure, but forfeiture is still available if the contract permits it.10 8
The general rule is that the vendor may seek ejectment or quiet title
plus a writ of assistance if the defaulting purchaser refuses to give up
possession. This is without any other action to dispose of the purchaser's
right to redemption or right to restitution of payments made.109 In Abbas
v. Demont,"0 for instance, the Nebraska court reversed the trial court's
allowance of a sixty day redemption period and allowed immediate eject-
ment against a defaulting purchaser, commenting, "courts are not author-
ized to rewrite contracts that the parties themselves made.""' The vendor,
who had not even complied with his contract by declaring a forfeiture,
recovered not only the land, but retained $2,143.80 paid on the purchase
price of $8,950. This seems a harsh result; however, there was consider-
able evidence in the case that the purchaser had delayed unnecessarily.
The court, despite its affirmation of the general rule, is usually aware
of the equities of the case and can protect them where necessary. This is
seen in Ruhl v. Johnson,12 also a Nebraska case, where the vendor
brought suit in ejectment only to have the trial court convert it into an
action for strict foreclosure, and on appeal even that remedy was rejected
as being inequitable under the circumstances. The purchaser had paid
approximately $16,000 towards a purchase price of $38,000 before his
default and objected to ejectment on the ground that he had a substantial
equity. After transfer to the equity court, the chancellor found the pur-
chaser in default some $2,000 and ordered strict foreclosure unless the
default was cured within sixty days. On appeal, it was held that on these
facts even strict foreclosure was inequitable and the case was sent back,
apparently for foreclosure by sale."' So long as the courts observe the
equities there is, perhaps, nothing objectionable in allowing ejectment or
writ of assistance without any other action specifically aimed at preserving
the purchaser's rights. But it does create some uncertainty, as the language
of the courts is frequently at variance with their actions.
106. Wordinger v. Wirt, supra note 69.
107. International Realty Associates v. McAdoo, 87 Fla. 1, 99 So. 117 (1924).
108. Richards v. Hasty, 158 Fla. 459, 28 So.2d 876 (1947); Barnett v. Dollison,
125 Fla. 254, 169 So. 665 (1936).
109. See In re De Stuers' Estate, 99 N.Y.S.2d 739 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1950); 55 A-x. JuR.
Vendor & Purchaser § 438 (1946).
110. 152 Neb. 77, 40 N.W.2d 265 (1949).
111. Id. at 82, 40 N.W.2d at 267.
.112. 154 Neb. 810, 49 N.W.2d 687 (1951).
113. See Weaver v. Gilbert, 214 Ark. 800, 218 S.W.2d 353 (1949); but cf. Industrial
Loan & Inv. Co. v. Lowe, 173 Neb. 624, 114 N.W.2d 393 (1962).
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The choice between quiet title and ejectment as a means of recovering
possession would seem to be dictated by the facts. Where the purchaser is
in possession there need be no resort to equity merely to oust him. But,
if the contract is recorded, or if it constitutes a threat of future injury
to the vendor, then suit to quiet title with writ of assistance would seem
in order.114 Of course, a writ of assistance is also available where fore-
closure is used. 115
There is no duty on the part of a vendor to refund payments made
by the purchaser in default as a condition of the vendor's obtaining either
ejectment or quiet title. In Pierce & Stevenson v. Jones,"" a suit to remove
a cloud upon the vendor's title wherein the purchaser sought recovery of
his down payment of $7,000 the Florida Supreme Court distinguished
between suits for equitable cancellation or rescission and suits merely
to remove a cloud. In the former, the vendor is seeking the aid of equity
in rescinding the contract and thus, as rescission implies a restoration of
the status quo ante, the vendor would be under an obligation to make
restitution. But in a suit to quiet title, the vendor seeks merely to remove
from record a contract which by its own terms has ceased to exist, and
thus the equity the vendor seeks requires no corresponding equity on his
part." 7 The weakness of this argument is that equities do not depend
upon the relief sought, nor upon the label of the particular action, but
upon the underlying facts. In Pierce & Stevenson the result did not shock
the court and thus the decision could conveniently be made to hinge upon
the particular relief sought. Had the result been one which shocked the
court's conscience, and had the forfeiture been out of proportion to any
injury sustained by the vendor, the result might have been different."18
Another argument made in favor of allowing quiet title and forfeiture in
the same equity suit is that the vendor in giving notice of forfeiture and
in seeking to quiet his title is not repudiating the contract but acting
in furtherance of it and, therefore, there is no rescission and thus no
need to restore payments made."19 This is merely another way of avoiding
an inquiry into the equities. The fact remains that most courts will not
require return of payments made as a condition of granting the vendor
either ejectment or quiet title.
20
The availability of summary proceedings, notably forcible entry and
unlawful detainer, as a means of recovering possession from a defaulting
114. Barnett v. Dollison, supra note 108.
115. Diggle v. Baudlen, supra note 77.
116. 109 Fla. 517, 147 So. 842 (1933).
117. But see Taylor v. Rawlins, 86 Fla. 279, 97 So. 714 (1923)1 where the vendor's
forfeiture was termed a rescission and restitution was required as a condition of quieting
the vendor's title. See Parchen v. Rowley, supra note 96.
118. See Haas v. Crisp Realty Co. 65 So.2d 765 (Fla. 1953); Taylor v. Rawlins,
supra note 117.
119. Mintle v. Sylvester, 202 Iowa 1128, 211 N.W. 367 (1926).
120. Hinsch v. Mothorn, 44 Idaho 539, 258 Pac. 540 (1927); Lawrence v. Demos,
70 Wyo. 56, 244 P.2d 793 (1952).
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purchaser, will vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction depending upon the
scope of the action given by local law. In Colorado, for instance, a statute
makes a vendee in default remaining in possession guilty of unlawful
detainer. 2 ' But, in New York, even where the contract provides that
upon the purchaser's default the vendor may elect to treat him as a hold-
over tenant, the vendor may not resort to summary proceedings which are
restricted to landlord and tenant, but must bring ejectment or foreclose
the contract.1 22
In Ohio forcible entry and unlawful detainer are available only to
try to issue of possession. In Swiers v. Smith, 2 ' a forcible entry and un-
lawful detainer case brought by the vendor, the court recognized that each
of the parties claimed an interest in the land worth more than $2,000, the
jurisdictional limit of the court. But, construing its action as one for
possession only, the court retained jurisdiction and relegated the question
of title to a subsequent suit in Common Pleas. The jurisdiction to deter-
mine possession was said to depend upon the existence of the forfeiture
clause.
Michigan permits recovery of possession by a vendor using summary
proceedings but by statute delays eviction until 90 days after judgment,
and if the purchaser has paid more than 50% of the purchase price, the
statute delays eviction for six months. During this period of enforced
delay, the purchaser may redeem by curing his default.'24 Despite the
delay, the statutory proceeding is usually more expeditious than the other
two available remedies, foreclosure and ejectment.
125
Iowa has permitted even more liberal use of forcible entry and de-
tainer. In Spangler v. Misner,28 the court recognized that the result of
such an action was to forfeit the purchaser's contract rights as well as to
determine rights to possession. This appears more realistic than the posi-
tion of the Ohio courts, which purport only to try rights of possession by
forcible entry, leaving title for courts with greater jurisdiction. However,
the Ohio statute making judgments for forcible entry and unlawful de-
tainer no bar to subsequent suits upon the same facts, undoubtedly ac-
counts for Ohio's position. 27
The Florida statute on unlawful detainer is sufficiently broad to
permit its use by a vendor to recover possession from a defaulting pur-
121. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 58-1-4(9) (1953). But see White v. Widger, 144 Colo. 566,
358 P.2d 592 (1960).
122. Burkhard v. Tucker, 27 Misc. 724, 59 N.Y. Supp. 711 (1899); see Smith v.
Keech, 112 N.Y.S.2d 803 (1952).
123. 5 Ohio Op. 2d 139, 150 N.E.2d 517 (Munic. Ct. Oberlin 1958); accord, State
ex rel Jenkins v. Hamilton County Court, 114 Ohio App. 231, 173 N.E.2d 186 (1961);
Gallagher v. Bilmaier, 6 Ohio Op. 2d 142, 154 N.E.2d 472 (Lucas County Ct. 1958).
124. MICH. Cou. LAWS § 630.25 (Supp. 1956).
125. Zaino v. North Woodward Const. Co., 355 Mich. 425, 95 N.W.2d 33 (1959).
126. 238 Iowa 600, 28 N.W.2d 5 (1947).
127. Omo REV. CoDE § 1923.03 (1958).
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chaser. 28 It purports to try only the right to possession and damages and
cannot be used to try title. 2 ' Despite the broad language of the statute,
however, the practice has not been to use unlawful detainer in the vendor-
purchaser situation but to restrict it to landlord and tenant.
II. REMEDIES OF THE PURCHASER
Turning now from the vendor's remedies, let us take a look at the
choice of remedy accorded a non-defaulting purchaser against a vendor
in default. The right to restitution of a purchaser in default, the counter-
part to the vendor's right of forfeiture, will be dealt with separately in
the third and final article of this series.
In view of the independence of the covenants and that the pur-
chaser's obligation to pay precedes the vendor's obligation to make
conveyance of the legal title, the vendor under an installment land con-
tract usually will not be in default until the final payment is due. How-
ever, should the vendor disable himself from performing, declare his
refusal to be bound by the contract, or otherwise commit an anticipatory
breach, the purchaser has a remedy.'3 0 Unfortunately for the purchaser,
however, a mere unmarketable title in the vendor prior to the closing day
is not a breach and the purchaser must continue to make his payments
despite the existence of encumbrances or a defective title in the vendor.''
The purchaser who has not performed or has only partly performed at the
time he learns of the vendor's anticipatory breach is excused from further
performance." 2 It would appear that any breach which would excuse
further performance would be a sufficient anticipatory breach to support
rescission or an action for damages."' Where the breach is slight it may
not support rescission, although it may be enough to sustain an action
for damages, and specific performance may be available to either party
with compensation decreed to make up for the defect.
1 4
A. Suit at Law for Damages
Should the purchaser elect to sue for damages upon the vendor's
breach, the measure of damages will vary depending upon the jurisdic-
tion." Upon a total breach by the seller, two principal rules have been
128. FLA. STAT. § 82.04 (1963).
129. FLA. STAT. § 82.05 (1963).
130. Huggins v. Green Top Dairy Farms, 75 Idaho 436, 273 P.2d 399 (1954).
131. Luette v. Bank of Italy, 42 F.2d 9 (9th Cir. 1930); Werth v. Willer, 64 N.D.
119, 250 N.W. 543 (1933).
132. Ross v. Kunkel, 257 Wis. 197, 43 N.W.2d 26 (1950).
133. Werth v. Willer, supra note 131; Ross v. Kunkel, supra note 132.
134. Tolchester Beach Improvement Co. v. Boyd, 161 Md. 269, 156 Atl. 795 (1931)
(vendor allowed specific performance with abatement); Smith v. Hornkohl, 166 Neb. 702,
90 N.W.2d 347 (1958) (purchaser granted specific performance with abatement).
135. See generally McCoRmicx, DAMAGES §§ 177-184 (1935).
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adopted. The so-called American rule, adopted in many of the states,
allows the purchaser the difference between the purchase price and market
value plus any payments which the purchaser may have already made.3 6
The English rule, which together with its variations is followed in other
American jurisdictions, depends upon the good faith or lack of it of the
defaulting vendor.'37 If the vendor is not guilty of bad faith, the purchaser
is entitled to recover payments made, plus interest, together with the cost
of investigating title and any profit realized by the vendor on a subse-
quent sale. 8 If the vendor acted in bad faith, or if he had no title, even
though he hoped to acquire it, the purchaser can recover for the loss of
his bargain.""
The distinction between the two rules is not, however, so clear cut as
some authorities seem to imply.4 ° Regardless of the jurisdiction, if all the
purchaser seeks, upon the vendor's total breach, is a return of payments
made, rescission will usually be allowed.' So the distinction will appear
only in those cases where the purchaser claims loss of his bargain as an
item of damage. When it is further considered that, even under the English
rule, loss of bargain is a proper claim if the vendor acted in bad faith,
it is obvious that regardless of the jurisdiction, under such circumstances,
the result will be the same. Only where the vendor did not breach his con-
tract in bad faith and the purchaser is seeking damages for loss of his
bargain will the issue make the choice of rule determinative. And even
then, variations in the definition of bad faith may cause some blurring
of the distinctions.
In Kentucky, for instance, the English rule was long exemplified by
Potts v. Moran's Executors,'42 which denied recovery for loss of bargain
where the vendor was unable to get his wife to join in the conveyance
and his inability was not attributable to bad faith. Kramer v. Mobley,
43
a more recent case, apparently evidenced merely a variation of the same
rule when it restricted the purchaser to restitution upon the vendor's
refusal to remove an incumbrance, where the vendor offered to indemnify
the purchaser but insisted upon contesting the validity of the encum-
brance. Then, in Raisor v. Jackson,14 the Kentucky court reexamined
Potts and overruled it, yet distinguished and affirmed Kramer. The facts
in Raisor were substantially the same as those in Potts. The vendor was
unable to convey because his wife would not join in the conveyance, the
jury found no bad faith, and the trial court, following the English rule,
136. Adams v. Cox, 54 N.M. 256, 221 P.2d 555 (1950).
137. Frey v. Nakles, 380 Pa. 616, 112 A.2d 329 (1955).
138. Kramer v. Mobley, 309 Ky. 143, 216 S.W.2d 930 (1949).
139. Frey v. Nakles, supra note 137.
140. See 3 AMERicAw LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 11.67(a) (Casner ed. 1952),
141. Adams v. Henderson, 168 U.S. 573 (1897).
142. 236 Ky. 28, 32 S.W.2d 534 (1930).
143. Supra note 138.
144. 311 Ky. 803, 225 S.W.2d 657 (1950).
[VOL. XIX
INSTALLMENT LAND CONTRACT
awarded one dollar nominal damages. On appeal this determination was
reversed and the distinction was made between latent and patent defects
of title. Kramer was distinguished because there the vendor was not aware
of the encumbrance until just before the closing, and his good faith was
shown by his willingness to indemnify the purchaser. But in Raisor the
vendor knew he needed his wife's joinder to convey a good title, and
therefore he assumed the risk of obtaining it. His good faith, or lack of
it, was held to be immaterial.
In New York, however, even where the vendor contracts to convey
property which he knew he had no power to convey, the issue of good faith
remains, and a summary judgment will be denied where there remains an
issue of fact as to whether the purchaser was aware of the vendor's in-
ability at the time the contract was entered into.14' The determination of
this fact will control the measure of damages.
Florida follows the English rule and adopts a position midway be-
tween that of Kentucky and that of New York. In a case where the
vendor's breach was the result of his wife's refusal to join in the con-
veyance, the Florida Supreme Court has held that such a breach is the
result of bad faith,14 and that the purchaser is entitled to recover for
the loss of his bargain.
The principal justification for the American rule lies in its analogy to
the rule in sales of personal property and to the fact that the injury is the
same to the purchaser whether the motive of the vendor in refusing to
perform be good or bad. The rationale of the English rule is to be found in
the even closer analogy to the rule of damages for breach of covenants of
title4 and in the speculative nature of damages which must depend upon
a finding of market value. 14S Those jurisdictions which adhere to the
American position, however, are prepared to follow it to its logical con-
clusion. In County of Lincoln v. Fischer,49 in granting specific perform-
ance to a purchaser under an installment land contract where the contract
price was $500 and the market value was $50,000, the Oregon court
pointed out that damages at law would be equally harsh as the purchaser
would be entitled to the difference between the two. The English rule has
much in its favor. It is more flexible and permits adjustment in the light
of the equities. Some states have embodied the English rule in a statute' 50
which would appear to prevent its development along the lines it has
taken in Kentucky. The best solution to the problem of damage for
vendor's breach is to deal with it in the contract. Either a reasonable
145. Diamond Central, Inc. v. Gilbert, 13 App. Div. 2d 931, 216 N.Y.S.2d 609 (1961).
146. Key v. Alexander, 91 Fla. 975, 108 So. 883 (1926).
147. Taylor v. Wallace, 20 Colo. 211, 37 Pac. 963 (1894).
148. See McCoamcx, DAMAGES § 180 (1935).
149. 216 Ore. 421, 339 P.2d 1084 (1959).
150. CAL. Civ. CODE § 3306; MONT. Rav. CODE § 17-306 (1947).
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liquidated damage clause or a clause limiting liability to restitution plus
reliance damages should be satisfactory.
B. Specific Performance at Suit of the Purchaser
Specific performance at suit of the purchaser is one of the classic
equitable remedies. Land is considered unique and the remedy at law is
almost uniformly held to be an inadequate substitute for the land itself.151
However, unless the installment land contract permits the purchaser to
prepay his installments, he is unable to place the vendor in default until
the last payment is due and thus cannot avail himself of specific perform-
ance until he himself has fully performed.'52 Even where the vendor has
committed an anticipatory breach, the purchaser cannot usually resort to
specific performance, not only because the contract places the vendor's
performance in the future, but also because most actionable anticipatory
breaches are such as to preclude any performance by the vendor at all.
If it is still possible for the vendor to perform, but not yet time for him
to do so, there is no breach. 5' And if the vendor's action is such as to
prevent his ever performing, for instance, conveyance to a bona fide
purchaser, there is an anticipatory breach, but, of course, there can be
no specific performance.' 54 However, assuming that the purchaser under
an installment land contract has a right to tender all of his payments
and demand a deed, he will be entitled to specific performance upon the
same equitable principles as any other purchaser.
An interesting case and one which illustrates the application of
specific performance to installment land contracts is County of Lincoln v.
Fischer.1 5' The county, in 1944, entered into a contract with Fischer to
sell a quarter section of land for a total price of $500, $110 down and $39
a year for ten years. The contract further provided for forfeiture at the
option of the county upon any breach by the purchaser. Fischer paid the
down payment, but neglected to pay any of the installments. In 1945
Fischer sold his rights in the contract to Spalding Pulp and Paper Com-
pany. This suit was brought by the county in 1955 to quiet its title to the
land; Fischer and Spalding were both defendants. Spalding counterclaimed
for specific performance. The land at the time of suit was worth in excess
of $50,000. The trial court quieted title in the county and denied the
claim for specific performance. On appeal this decision was reversed. The
facts indicated that the county had, in 1947, attempted a statutory can-
cellation of the contract, but it was a nullity as no notice was given to the
purchaser. At no time did the county specifically exercise its right to
work a forfeiture according to the terms of the contract. In 1952 Spalding
151. Kitchen v. Herring, 42 N.C. 178 (1851).
152. Luette v. Bank of Italy, 42 F.2d 9 (9th Cir. 1930).
153. Ibid.
154. WALsIr, EQurrv § 87 (1930).
155. Supra note 149.
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had tendered the full amount due under the contract, but the county
rejected it. However, the county retained the down payment until the
time of suit, and during all the preceding years the county had accepted
payment of taxes from Fischer and later from Spalding. The Supreme
Court of Oregon held that the delay of the county in asserting its right of
forfeiture and its continued receipt of taxes prevented it from invoking
forfeiture at this late date without giving the purchaser an opportunity to
cure his default. It was further held that the delay of the purchaser in
completing his payments did not constitute laches as the vendor was not
in any way prejudiced thereby. To the county's argument that the con-
sideration was inadequate, the court pointed out that at the time the
contract was entered into $500 was a fair price for the land and that al-
though it might seem harsh to compel the county to convey land worth
over $50,000 for $500, it would be equally harsh to deprive the purchaser
of land now worth $50,000 and which in equity had been his throughout.
The court further stated that even if specific performance were to be
denied and the purchaser remitted to his action at law, his damages would
be the difference between the contract price of $500 and the market
value of $50,000.
Partial performance with compensation is available to a purchaser
in those cases where the vendor cannot give full performance and the
purchaser is willing to take less with a reduction of the purchase price to
compensate him for the vendor's default.' 56 In many of these situations
the vendor's default relates to the size or area of the land contracted to
be sold, but it may arise from a defect in title as well.' When the defect
is relatively slight, the vendor may compel the purchaser to specifically
perform by tendering partial performance and compensation, but only if
the purchaser will receive substantially that for which contracted.'
However, where the purchaser is the plaintiff, the issue of materiality
should seem to be foreclosed. Despite the extent of the default, if it is
capable of valuation and if the purchaser is willing to take substantially
less than he contracted for, specific performance with compensation should
be decreed.' 59
C. Restitution of Payments
We have already seen that recovery of paymets made may be an item
of damage for breach of contract by the vendor. And under the English
rule, where the vendor's breach was in good faith, restoration of payments
made and expenses incurred in reliance on the vendor's performance are
the measure of recovery. But a purchaser need not be restricted to
156. Smith v. Hornkohl, 166 Neb. 702, 90 N.W.2d 347 (1958).
157. Reed v. Phillips, 191 Ark. 58, 83 S.W.2d 554 (1935).
158. Van Blarcom v. Hopkins, 63 N.J. Eq. 466, 52 Ad. 147 (1902).
159. Reed v. Phillips, supra note 157. See 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.69
(Casner ed. 1952).
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damages for breach. He may elect to rescind the contract. In this case,
although his recovery may appear the same, it is really not the same.
It derives from a different theory and although it may reach the same
end, it travels a different route. Recovery of payments as an item of dam-
age for breach is compensation to the plaintiff for his injury. Restitution of
payments upon a rescission is a means of preventing the unjust enrich-
ment of the defendant. The amount of recovery in one case will usually be
identical with the recovery in the other, but it need not be so.
16°
The installment land contract, like any other contract, may be
rescinded for fraud, mistake, duress, incompetency, or material breach
by either party.'61 The essence of rescission is that both parties are
relieved of their obligations under the contract and that they are restored
to the position they held prior to entering the contract. In other words,
rescission is usually coupled with restitution. Restitution of benefits con-
ferred under a contract which is void or voidable may be obtained either
in equity or at law.'" 2 The action at law is usually in general assumpsit,
for money had and received. This is quasi contract; the law raises the
obligation of the defaulting vendor to make restitution because his reten-
tion of the benefits he has received would result in his unjust enrich-
ment. 163 It is the rescission of the contract that makes the retention
unjust. So long as the contract endures it explains the vendor's possession
of the payments. But with the contract rescinded there is no reason for
the vendor retaining the fruits of the contract. Thus, a prerequisite to
bringing an action for restitution at law is that the plaintiff shall have
declared a rescission by his own act, and such a declaration requires that
he restore, or offer to restore, to the defendant any benefits which he,
the plaintiff, shall have received.' Upon this unilateral rescission by
the plaintiff rests the theoretical structure of the resulting quasi contract
action. The extra judicial rescission by the plaintiff ends the contract and
makes the defendant's retention of any benefits received under it unjust
and inequitable. The law will then, "quasi ex contractu," raise an obliga-
tion on the defendant's part to make restitution of the benefits he has
received.
The action in equity is an action for rescission, not one based upon
a rescission as is the suit at law. Therefore, rescission is not a prerequisite
in equity, rather it is a result. 65 Also, a court of equity has power to
160. Bechard v. Bolton, 316 Mich. 1, 24 N.W.2d 422 (1946). See Boomer v. Muir,
24 P.2d 570 (Cal. App. 1933).
161. 3 AmERicAN LAW OF PROEaTY § 11.70 (Casner ed. 1952).
162. Roller v. California Pac. Title Ins. Co., 92 Cal. App. 2d 149, 206 P.2d 694 (1949).
163. See Moses v. Macferlan, 2 Burr. 1005, 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (K.B. 1760).
164. Cole v. Atkins, 69 Ariz. 81, 209 P.2d 859 (1949); Tisdale v. Buckmore, 33 Me.
461 (1851). But see N.Y. CIVIL PRcrICE ACT § 112(g) adopting the equity rule and
eliminating tender as a prerequisite to suit at law as well as in equity.
165. Allerton v. Allerton, 50 N.Y. 670 (1872).
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condition the rescission of the contract upon the restoration of benefits
received by the plaintiff and thus may require an accounting to determine
the net benefit which the defendant must disgorge.168
The distinction between a rescission by mutual assent 87 and a
termination of the purchaser's contract rights by forfeiture168 is a narrow
one in fact but a vast one in legal consequence. In the former the purchaser
is entitled to restitution of payments made; in the latter his payments are
forfeited. As might be expected, the law's abhorrence of forfeitures fre-
quently results in a finding of rescission where the intent of the vendor
was clearly to work a forfeiture. 69
Just as the vendor has a security interest in the land under contract
which is called a vendor's lien, so does the purchaser have a vendee's
lein.170 The vendee's lien is not inconsistent with rescission of the contract,
despite some authority to the contrary,' 71 as it does not depend upon the
existence of the contract, but is created by equity for the purpose of doing
justice.172 And although a purchaser seeking a money judgment to recover
his payments will be limited in many jurisdictions to an action at law on
the ground that the remedy at law is adequate, 73 a prayer for a vendee's
lien will bring the case into equity."'
Upon the vendor's default, the purchaser is faced with a problem of
election of remedies and its related problems of affirmance or disaffirmance
of the contract and waiver of the right to rescind. A suit for damages for
fraud of the vendor or for a material breach by the vendor, depending as
it does upon the existence of a binding agreement to create those damages,
is generally held to be inconsistent with rescission and a bar to a sub-
sequent suit for rescissionY.17 A suit for damages is an affirmance of the
contract at a time when the purchaser had knowledge of grounds for
rescission and thus is similar to the situation arising when a purchaser,
with knowledge of the vendor's breach, nonetheless continues to make his
payments. This has been held to be a waiver of any cause of action, a
waiver of the fraud itself.
76
But if the purchaser, upon the vendor's default, elects to rescind,
but is unsuccessful in his suit for rescission, this is no bar to a subsequent
166. Lang v. Giraudo, 311 Mass. 132, 40 N.E.2d 707 (1942).
167. Bohlin v. Jorgensen, 341 Ill. App. 281, 93 N.E.2d 89 (1950).
168. Tucker v. Beam, 343 Ill. App. 290, 98 N.E.2d 871 (1951).
169. Taylor v. Rawlins, 86 Fla. 279, 97 So. 714 (1933); Fulton v. Chase, 240 Iowa
771, 37 N.W.2d 920 (1949); GuiU v. Pugh, 311 Ky. 90, 223 S.W.2d 574 (1949).
170. Cole v. Haynes, 216 Miss. 485, 62 So.2d 779 (1953).
171. Davis v. William Rosenzweig Realty Operating Co., 192 N.Y. 128, 84 N.E. 943
(1908). But see N.Y. Crvm PRACTicE AcT § 112.
172. Witte v. Hobolth, 224 Mich. 286, 195 N.W. 82 (1923).
173. Laubengayer v. Rohde, 167 Mich. 605, 133 N.W. 535 (1911).
174. German Bundesheim Soc'y v. Schmidt, 242 Mich. 139, 218 N.W. 664 (1928).
175. Donovan v. Curts, 245 Mich. 348, 222 N.W. 743 (1929).
176. Monroe v. Hoffman, 276 Mich. 281, 267 N.W. 836 (1936).
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suit for damages in affirmance of the contract. 177 This result is not an
exception to the doctrine of election of remedies but arises from the fact
that the very lack of success in the suit to rescind indicates an existing
contract.
It has been held that the bringing of an action for deceit is not an
election when at the time that suit was brought the statute of limitations
had already run against it.17 The ignorance of the plaintiff of the running
of the statute at the time he commenced suit prevented him from making
an election and his ignorance of the nature of his rights prevented a waiver
of them. Where but one remedy exists, there cannot be an election.7
This argument would seem to destroy the doctrine of election of remedies
completely. Whenever the deceit action or other action in affirmance fails
of success, its very failure is an indication that no right existed. If no
right existed, based upon affirmance of the contract, then the choice of
such a remedy would be no choice at all.
177. Dial Press, Inc. v. Phillips, 23 N.J. Super. 543, 93 A.2d 195 (1952), appeal denied,
12 N.J. 248, 96 A.2d 454 (1953).
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179. Ibid.
